Legislating in the echo chamber? by Williams, K.
Legislating in the echo chamber?
WILLIAMS, K.
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/701/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
WILLIAMS, K. (2005). Legislating in the echo chamber? New law journal.
Repository use policy
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the 
individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print 
one copy of any article(s) in SHURA to facilitate their private study or for non-
commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain.
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk 
LEGISLATING IN THE ECHO CHAMBER? 
 
The publication on 3rd November of the Compensation Bill 2005 is a fine example 
of what the US military calls ‘command emphasis’.  In March 2005, when on the 
pre-election stump, the Prime Minister announced that many public servants 
(particularly teachers and healthcare workers) were worried they might ‘be 
subject to unfair legal action’ and that ways must be found to ‘protect’ them 
from what he called a ‘real problem’.  Within eight months, the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs has produced a bill which, at least in part, appears to be a 
direct response to this newly revealed Prime Ministerial concern.  The fact that a 
report in May 2004, Better Routes to Redress from the Better Regulation Task 
Force (BRTF), had said there was little hard evidence to support the idea that 
Britain was beset by a ‘litigation crisis’ or was developing an undesirable 
‘compensation culture’ seems to have been overlooked.  
 
Part 2 of the Compensation Bill is a consumer protection measure providing 
powers to regulate ‘claims farmers’.  Something of the sort was widely 
anticipated, having been recommended by the BRTF, and is likely to be strongly 
supported in Parliament.  No more will be said here about this, though  
numerous examples of sharp practice will, no doubt, be adduced to justify the 
attention of our legislators. Instead we will concentrate on Part 1 of the Bill. 
 
Part 1 consists of a single clause.  It provides that XXXXX. 
 
Being addressed to the courts, at first sight this looks uncontroversial, technical 
lawyers’ law, and for that reason may attract only limited parliamentary 
scrutiny, which would be unfortunate. The ‘Explanatory Notes’ accompanying 
the Bill claim the clause does no more than re-state the existing law as declared 
in the superior courts in recent times. But what exactly it means and how it 
might be expected to give effect to Mr. Blair’s wish to see potential defendants, 
particularly those in the public sector, better protected from unfair harassing 
litigation and judgments is less than clear.  
 
The first thing to note is that the clause expressly confines itself to dealing with 
questions of breach – with how the standard of care is to be fixed – and not with 
the duty issue.  Judges will, therefore, continue to be free to go on recognising (in 
the now conventional, post-Caparo, incremental manner) new categories of 
relationships said to be capable of giving rise to responsibility in negligence.  Had 
it been otherwise, it is doubtful whether the Minister could have certified that the 
Bill complied with the UK’s commitment to respect the European Convention of 
Human Rights. 
 
The clause is side noted ‘Deterrent Effects of Negligence’.  This effect, which is 
sometimes (though by no means universally) assumed by courts, is frequently 
contested by academic commentators.  As Professor Cane recently observed, ‘the 
evidence we have about the positive regulatory impact of tort law is patchy and 
inconclusive’, adding that while it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
possibility of tort liability ‘has some impact on people’s conduct, the precise 
nature and magnitude of that impact is largely speculative’. 1  A good example of 
this sort of uncertainty is ‘defensive medicine’, the deleterious existence of which 
is strongly asserted, especially by doctors.  Yet it is a contested phenomenon, for 
which there is little reliable evidence documenting its precise nature, extent or 
effects.  As a recent report from the National Audit Office points out, the NHS 
has not even fully exploited its experience of actual malpractice litigation.2  What 
we do know is that the medical profession has a strong tendency to exaggerate its 
exposure to the risk of being sued: a condition that seems also to have infected 
teachers recently.3  Currently, there are few demonstrable connections between 
(the threat of) liability and real world behaviour, which will leave judges having 
to continue their common sense speculations about the likely impact of any 
decision about where to pitch the standard of care.      
 
The notion of instructing judges to have regard to the effects on ‘desirable 
activities’ of breach decisions seems fraught with difficulties. Of course, it is well 
established that we are all entitled to take exceptional risks in an emergency in 
order to avoid (life-threatening) adverse outcomes that would not be justifiable 
in the absence of the emergency.  A single Good Samaritan doctor with few 
resources attempting to save a roadside casualty is, rightly, unlikely to be 
criticised, let alone judged against the standards of a specialist team operating 
with the backup of a hospital A & E department.  A driver is justified in 
swerving violently to avoid a child who runs into the road in front of his vehicle, 
even though by doing so he may put his passengers and others at risk.  On the 
other hand, the notion that undefined (socially) ‘desirable activities’ require 
special consideration 
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1
 See Peter Cane ‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27 Melbourne 
University Law Review 649. 
 
2
 See NAO/D of H, A Safer Place: Learning to Improve Patient Safety (HC 456, November 2005).  
 
3
 See Education Outside the Classroom, Second Report, (HC Paper 120, February 2005) describing 
teachers’ fears of being sued (or prosecuted) following an accident as ‘entirely out of proportion to the 
real risks’. 
